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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions highlights the central tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and ending wars—despite the fact that this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson echoed this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but observers caution it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Strains

Differing from his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Conditional Intervention

A similar standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.